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Abstract. The Indian religious traditions, including Buddhism, are generally 
characterised by an understanding of the problematic character of the human condition 
as ignorance (avidya) instead of sin, as in Christianity.1 The centrality of ignorance 
in defining the problematic character of the human condition creates a dramatically 
different religious dynamic—a religious dynamic that is fundamentally concerned 
with epistemological issues rather than with moral ones. In Indian discussions of 
the limits of religious knowledge, the shared intellectual framework was the idea 
of means of valid knowledge (pramāṇa). While other religio-philosophic traditions 
in India accepted testimony (śabda) as an autonomous (i.e., irreducible) means of 
valid knowledge, Buddhist epistemologists rejected it. Having rejected the idea that 
testimony is an autonomous means of valid knowledge (śabdapramāṇa), an alternative 
explanation for the authority of the Buddha had to be created. Against this background 
of epistemological discussion, particular attention is given here to Dharmakīrti’s views 
on the authority of the Buddha as a means of valid knowledge regarding the ground of 
human existence, the path of religious practice, and the goal of awakening. 
Preface
The study of Indian philosophy generally and Buddhist philosophy in particular has 
been hampered by the misrepresentation of Indian philosophic thought by some 
scholars who portray it as either irrational or antirational.2 In this representation, 
1 The explicit formulation of this understanding has been traced to what is known as the ‘old 
Nyāya school’, the founding text of which probably dates from some time in the 3rd or 4th century 
CE. Any such explicit formulation must have a broad basis of intellectual consent upon which it 
is formulated. Van Bijlert 1989, 1, for example, tells us that ‘[t]he first Indian school of thinking 
which explicitly teaches that the supreme good, defined as emancipation from all suffering, can be 
the object of rational inquiry and which, moreover, propounds a system of epistemology, logic and 
dialectics in order to give definite shape to this rational inquiry, seems to be the old Nyāya-school’.
2 Richard King calls attention to this one-sided representation of Indian thought in his discussion 
of the Nyāya school. ‘The significance of the Nyāya system lies particularly in its thoroughgoing de-
fence of perceptual realism, its appeal to a pragmatic empiricism and the school’s strong commitment 
to rational debate and clear, logical argumentation. It is a crucial example, therefore, in demonstrating 
that Indian philosophical debate is thoroughly grounded in the rules of logical debate and is neither 
irrational nor other-worldly and impractical’ (King 1999, 130). See also Ganeri 2003, ch. 20.
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Indian thought is said to be solely concerned with ‘the spiritual’, which is itself 
defined in opposition to rationality. This image seems to date from the earliest 
contacts between modern European philosophers and Indian thought, forming part 
of the colonialist heritage, and was informed by a presumption that the values of the 
Enlightenment were uniquely the accomplishment of Europeans (Matilal 1986, 2–5).3 
Romantics picked up this image, reversed the valence, and reinforced it by employing 
it in their own critique of Western modernity as burdening the creativity of the human 
spirit with the strictures of reason. Themselves appropriating this critique of Western 
modernism, some Indian thinkers then deployed this reversed valuation, placing a 
positive value on India’s putative spirituality, invidiously contrasted with Europe’s 
putative materiality. For example, the highly influential Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan 
asserted that the value of Indian thought was to be found in its ability to counteract 
modernity:
With its profound sense of spiritual reality brooding over the world of our ordinary 
experience, Indian thought may perhaps wean us moderns from a too exclusive 
preoccupation with secular life or the temporary formulations in which logical thought has 
too often sought to imprison spiritual aspirations.4 
While the general rhetorical direction for representing Indian thought moved 
toward an image of an antirational, mystical spirituality, a similar kind of rhetorical 
apologetics—but with a different content—effected the representation of Buddhism 
as well. One version of this was modernising apologetics that tended to identify 
Buddhism with empiricism.5 
3 Matilal cites both Hume and Locke in this regard, and goes on to point out that the misrep-
resentation has carried forward into the work of such recent philosophers as Anthony Flew (1971). 
In contrast, as Halbfass 1988, 161, notes in relation to the specifically philosophic discourse: ‘It is 
undeniable that there is currently a greater willingness to credit India with a philosophical tradi-
tion of its own, and to include some information about it in general reference works on philosophy 
and its history’. This improvement in academic philosophy is not, however, matched in the popular 
religious discourse at least in America, which continues to recycle dated stereotypes created by the 
Romantics in support of their own position. 
4 Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, ‘Fragments of a Confession’, quoted in Ganeri 2001, 2. 
5 The equation of at least early Buddhist epistemology with empiricism is widespread through-
out late 19th and early 20th century introductions of Buddhism to Western audiences and continues 
in popular representations of Buddhism right into the present. In chronological order, just some of 
the authors presenting this view includes: Olcott 1890; Carus 1894; David-Neel 1911; Dharmapala 
1912; Shaku 1974; Suzuki 1933; Baptist 1959; Jayatilleke 1963; Kalupahana 1969; Ambedkar 1974; 
Kalupahana 1975; Batchelor 1997; Ricard, Trinh 2001; Wallace 2002; Jones 2003; Smith, Novak 
2004; Harris 2006; Ajahn Brahmavamso [s.d.]. My thanks to Dr. Natalie Quli for compiling this list 
of sources.
We should not be misled into believing that this large bulk of sources indicates that the view 
must be correct. The sociology of knowledge teaches us that such ideas can become effectively 
self-replicating, taking on greater autonomy and the appearance of legitimacy through repetition. 
Becoming simply ‘what everyone knows’, they are accepted as implicitly valid. Although a detailed 
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Many contemporary popular representations intended for Western audiences 
still reflect this modernising apologia, for example by characterising Buddhism 
as ‘a religion devoid of authority’ (Smith 1991, 94) or as a set of mental hygienic 
practices that do not demand the discomfort of evaluating beliefs and truth claims.6 
Any radically empiricist interpretation of Buddhism that follows along these lines 
is far from accurate, however, and would seem to derive from the apologetics of 
late 19th century advocates who cast Buddhism in terms more easily accessible to 
liberal Protestants.7 Known under the general category of ‘Buddhist modernism’, 
the representation of Buddhism that was promoted by these advocates was one 
that purposely highlighted aspects of the Buddhist tradition specifically selected to 
create an image of a religion that was eminently practical, humanistic, reasonable, 
critique of this view is beyond the scope of this essay, we can briefly say that the problem is with 
a simple, unnuanced equation of Buddhist epistemology with empiricism (not necessarily the 
case for all of the authors listed above). Risking something of a caricature by oversimplifying, 
we can summarise empiricism as deriving from the views of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, who 
asserted that there is only one means of knowledge—empirical. This position stands, of course, in 
opposition to the rationalism of Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibnitz, who also asserted a single means 
of knowledge, but in their case it was reason. As is fundamental to the rest of this paper, the Buddhist 
epistemologists asserted two means of knowledge, empirical (perception) and rational (inference). 
More generally, the tradition should not be described in such a way as to entail the oppositional 
structure of empiricism versus rationalism as those positions developed in Western philosophy. 
(Implicit in many such discussions is the idea that philosophy can be described in terms of a series 
of ahistorical positions on key philosophic issues. In works making this ‘philosophy is ahistorical’ 
assumption, one can find Indian philosophic views being explicated by reference to Western 
philosophic positions—Dharmakīrti’s position being explained not in terms of its own intellectual 
context, but by reference to Berkeley’s epistemological position. See, for example, Sinha 1972. In 
other words, under the assumption that philosophy is ahistorical, epistemology is assumed to be the 
same everywhere and always and that historical, social, or cultural differences are inconsequential 
to ‘purely’ philosophic projects. This attitude is evidenced, for example, by Surendranath Dasgupta, 
who opens his groundbreaking A History of Indian Philosophy with the assertion that ‘I have never 
considered it desirable that the philosophic interest should be subordinated to the chronological’ 
(Dasgupta 1975, 1: 11). Once clearly articulated, the assumption that there is some basic antagonism 
between the two should be obviously false. 
Albert William Levi (1974, 11) refers to the active historical placement of philosophic thought 
as ‘the doctrine of essential temporality, where the very meaning of texts hinges upon the historical 
questions they were designed to answer, and where, since “meaning” and “social context” are 
dependent variables, much attention must be paid by the historian of ideas to historical milieu, social 
structure, and epochal description’. I would maintain that this is not solely the task of ‘the historian 
of ideas’, but that it is the only intellectually defensible position. Philosophical—and theological—
works are not created in some Platonic realm of ideas but are attempts to answer historically specific 
questions, and to abstract them from that purpose impedes our own accurate understanding, even 
when our intent is to use them to our own philosophical or theological purposes.
6 The power of this rhetoric lies, at least in part, in its retroflexive ability to protect itself from 
evaluation. If Buddhism is not a matter of evaluating beliefs and truth claims, then the claim that 
Buddhism is not a matter of evaluating beliefs and truth claims need not itself be evaluated. 
7 We can speculate that the appeal of empiricism for Buddhist modernists is in part a conse-
quence of their associating themselves with Romantic views, which (again simplifying) were ex-
pressed in opposition to the rationalism of Enlightenment thought. For more on this important topic, 
see McMahan 2008.
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and concerned with promoting a rational ethical system.8 Such a representation, 
however, tended to marginalise aspects of the tradition that many living Buddhists 
both then and now considered to be very important.9 These included not only the 
ritual, mythic, and devotional aspects, but also views regarding Śākyamuni Buddha as 
the authoritative source for religious knowledge.10 It is justification for the authority 
of Śākyamuni Buddha by the medieval Indian Buddhist epistemologist Dharmakīrti 
that will allow us to explore the question of the limits of knowledge as understood in 
Buddhist epistemological thought more generally.
Introduction
As part of the broader Indian religious culture, Buddhist philosophy for the most 
part cast the problematic of human existence in terms of our ignorance about how 
the world works. How then can we learn how the world works, given that we are 
ourselves caught up in what Buddhist thought generally considers the two sources of 
error: afflictive obscurations and cognitive obscurations (kleśa-āvaraṇa11 and jñeya-
āvaraṇa)? Epistemologically, one of the sources for knowledge of the world is other 
people. But as children we are either taught—or learn the hard way—that not everyone 
is to be relied upon to tell us the truth or to provide us with an accurate understanding 
of how the world works. That strain of Indian Buddhist thought associated with the 
figures of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, which I will refer to here as the Buddhist 
epistemologists (pramāṇikas), asserted what might be considered a radically 
individual epistemology.12 In terms of the varieties of valid means of knowledge 
(pramāṇa), the epistemologists only accepted perception and inference, rejecting 
dependence on any other person (usually couched as the ‘speech’ of another, śabda). 
8 For a good summary treatment of Buddhist modernism, see Harvey 1990, 290–300. The as-
cription of rationalism to Buddhism is specifically mentioned on pp. 290, 297–98, and 300. 
9 Upon reflection, in a remarkably ironic exercise in hubris, this kind of preconception led to 
attempts by Western convert apologists to reform Buddhism so that it meets their own preconcep-
tions. Such efforts continue into the present, apparently unabated. This is not, of course, to defend all 
actions by all Buddhist institutions over the entirety of Buddhist history, but rather to simply raise 
the question of whether such efforts are not themselves part of a broader cultural imperialism. 
10 This was a very early issue for Buddhists. The debate over whether one is justified in basing a 
teaching on their own understanding of the Buddha’s intended meaning or only on the specific words 
of the Buddha is found in abhidharma literature (Cho 1997, 37–42).
11 Afflictions (kleśa) comprise two different kinds of obscurations (āvaraṇa), emotional and con-
ceptual. The term obscuration is used in order to suggest the hindrance of not having clear insight, 
maintaining the visual metaphor in English. The cognitive (jñeya) are ‘deeper’ and more pervasive 
than specific concepts, or ideas. Loosely speaking, they have to do with the process of thinking rather 
than the contents of thought.
12 While focusing on the corollaries of formal logic, Stcherbatsky’s Buddhist Logic (1958, 1) 
locates the concerns of these thinkers in a broader epistemological discourse, including sense per-
ception as a source of knowledge, the reliability of knowledge, and the relation between cognition 
and the external world.
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At present the discussion of Indian religious philosophy has come to accept the 
division of orthodox (astika, traditionally identified as six in number) philosophies 
from heterodox (nastika). The fundamental issue for this division is acceptance of 
the authority of the Vedas—the orthodox traditions accept, in one way or another, 
that the Vedas are authoritative, while the heterodox do not. As a tradition that is 
not based on the authority of the Vedas, Buddhism is one of the heterodox traditions. 
For Buddhism, however, the philosophic issues regarding authoritative knowledge 
raised by the Buddhist epistemologists make for a situation in which the authority of 
Śākyamuni Buddha cannot simply be substituted for that of the Vedas. An alternative 
justification had to be developed.
Testimony and the means of valid knowledge 
 in Indian religion
One of the important dimensions of Indian philosophy is the role of testimony 
(śabda) as a means of valid knowledge (pramāṇa). Śabda has a complex of meanings, 
including both sound and speech—
In its widest sense, the word śabda means a sound. But in a narrower sense it means a 
sound used as a symbol for the expression of some meaning. In this sense it stands for a 
‘word’. In the context of the pramāṇa doctrine śabda corresponds, therefore, to ‘authority’ 
or ‘testimony’. Śabdapramāṇa means knowledge derived from the authority of word or 
words. (Junankar 1978, 146)
This complex of meanings, then, places śabda equally within both epistemology 
and the philosophy of language—but as an epistemological concept it is commonly 
rendered as ‘testimony’. (Existing as it does as what in contemporary Western 
philosophic terminology would be a rather uncomfortable syncretism of philosophy 
of language and epistemology, śabda highlights the historically contingent character 
of the categories commonly used in Western philosophy.)
Standard treatments of classic Indian religious philosophy discuss six orthodox 
traditions, usually grouped into three pairs based on shared positions of one kind 
or another: Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya and Yoga, and Mīmāṃsa and Vedanta. 
Of these six schools, two took as their particular concern epistemological issues, the 
Nyāya and Mīmāṃsa. 
Discussions regarding the limits of knowledge were generally conducted in terms 
of the possible means of valid knowledge. The Mīmāṃsa claimed that there are six 
autonomous means of valid knowledge (pramāṇa), that is that the six are distinct and 
cannot be reduced to any of the others, either singly or in combination. Speaking, for 
example, specifically of śabda, Jonardon Ganeri describes this view of an autonomous 
means of valid knowledge, saying, ‘the language faculty is a sui generis epistemic 
faculty, reducible to neither perception nor inference nor to some combination of 
18 R I C H A R D  P AY N E
those two’ (Ganeri 1999, 15). The six means of valid knowledge recognised by the 
Mīmāṃsa school were perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), comparison 
(upamāna), verbal testimony (śabda, including both ‘revelation’, i.e., śruti—the 
Vedas as ‘something heard’, and the testimony of a reliable person), presumption (or 
postulation, arthāpatti), and non-apprehension (anupalabdhi) (Chatterjee, Datta 1960, 
45–7).13 In contrast, the Nyāya school only accepted four means of valid knowledge: 
perception, inference, comparison, and testimony (Chatterjee, Datta 1960, 33). 
The Mīmāṃsa tradition’s epistemology is structured in large part by the tradition’s 
primary concern, which is the efficacy of Vedic ritual. In other words, the goal of 
Mīmāṃsa thinkers was to explain why Vedic ritual, which includes the recitation of 
portions of the Vedas (mantra), was efficacious in producing the goals intended by the 
ritual performance. For the Mīmāṃsa, the authority of the Vedas was based not only 
on the idea that they are eternal and authorless, but that their existence is identical with 
the existence of the universe. In other words, they exist as an eternal sound (śabda)14 
or vibration, and from that eternal vibration the existence of the phenomenal universe 
comes into being.15 Thus, when the Vedas are spoken in the proper ritual context, it 
is this foundational eternal vibration that is being made present, and which makes the 
ritual effective.
The Mīmāṃsa conception of the ritual efficacy of Vedic words, i.e., mantra, 
exemplify for us the importance of the idea central to some of these conceptions 
of meaning, the idea that there is a strong relation (saṃbandha) between the word 
and its referent—a relation that provides validity or authority to the speech of such 
words.16 It is the ability to speak this eternal vibration that gives the speech of ritual 
performers authority in the sense of the efficacy of speaking what is true and real, 
giving us one conception of śabdapramāṇa, the authority of speech or testimony as 
a means of valid knowledge. The idea of the authority of speech, or testimony, was 
13 Chatterjee and Datta note that while the school of Mīmāṃsa established by Kumārıla Bhaṭṭa 
accepted these six, there was another Mīmāṃsa school established by Prabhākara that only accepted 
the first five and excluded non-cognition (anupalabdhi). See also Clooney 1992.
14 ‘Śabda’ is ‘sound’, and although it can be distinguished from language and word, which are 
‘vāk’, ‘pada’, and ‘vacana’, the terms are often used interchangeably (Motegi Shujun 2006, 39–40). 
15 These ideas seem to have provided the basis for later, tantric development of emanationist 
metaphysics. This cosmogony is strikingly similar to a neo-Platonic one, including that both see 
the process of emanation as one of degradation. There is, however, a key distinction in that, while 
Plotinus conceived of the emanation of being, in the Hindu tantra the emanation is one of sound 
structured according to the sequence of the Sanskrit syllabary. 
16 It is important to note that the idea of there being a ‘real connection’ (saṃbandha) between 
words and their referents is not universally shared by the orthodox philosophies. The position of 
Gautama, a key thinker for the Nyāya tradition, is like the Buddhist one a conventionalist under-
standing—‘right cognition of objects denoted by words is based upon convention (samaya)’ (Ju-
nankar 1978, 148). Regarding the characteristics of the Nyāya ‘theory of the meaning of a verbal 
awareness’, see Potter 1985, 217–18).
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extended to include ‘verbal testimony of a reliable person’, āpavacanā (though in 
some cases āpavacanā is also taken to include the Vedas) (Motegi Shujun 2006, 47). 
This included extending the idea of there being a correspondence, or real relation 
(saṃbandha), between word and referent from the Vedas to all reliable speech.17 
Perhaps the most important interlocutor for the Buddhist pramāṇikas was the Nyāya 
school, which also gave particular attention to issues related to epistemology and 
logic. As with the Buddhist epistemologists, Nyāya thought accepted perception and 
inference as means of valid knowledge. However, they also accepted ‘the credibility of 
testimony (śabda) which is a kind of indirect cognition (parokṣa-jñāna). One form of 
it is the reliability of what is commonly accepted (loka-prasiddha) except when there 
is overriding consideration to the contrary. Another form of it is that if the speaker 
or the author of the testimony is reliable, the testimony (unless there is counter- 
evidence) is reliable’ (Chakrabarti 1999, 12). This attitude of accepting testimony 
unless there is some reason to doubt it, some counter-evidence, differs markedly from 
the sceptical view asserted by Buddhist epistemologists such as Mokṣākaragupta in 
his Tarkabhāṣā (discussed infra). 
Religious authority in Buddhism
For the authority of the Buddha, however, to posit a real relation between word and 
referent was problematic. Fundamental to all Buddhist thought is the ontology of 
interdependence (pratītyasamutpāda), according to which all existing things only 
exist as a consequence of causes and conditions and do not have any absolute, eternal, 
unchanging or permanent essence. From its earliest recorded systematic thought, 
Buddhism has generally been nominalist in its orientation toward words, arguing that 
the connection between a word and its meaning is a matter of social convention.18 
Yet, members of the Buddhist tradition look to the words of the Buddha for 
guidance on the most basic aspects of their religious life, on what are commonly 
referred to in Buddhism as the ground, path and goal. Indeed, one finds contemporary 
Western Buddhist philosophers justifying their views by reference to the Pāli sutta 
literature, considered by many to be the oldest and therefore implicitly assumed to be 
the most authoritative record of the founder’s teachings.19 
17 This view has striking similarities to the position of linguistic ‘naturalism’ attributed to Craty-
lus in the Socratic dialogue of that name. See Sedley 2006.
18 On Buddhist philosophy of language as nominalist, see Siderits 1999, 341–48. Siderits’ de-
scription of nominalism is that the only thing that all cows share is the label ‘cow’. See also, Cox 
1995, 159–71; Jackson 1993, 125; and Klein 1986, 206–14. It is important to note that conventional 
does not mean arbitrary. While there may be no given or natural relation between words and mean-
ings, such relations are established by social use. 
19 Such bibliophilia—Biblio-philia—reflects not only the attitudes and presumptions of con-
temporary Western Buddhist thinkers, but also those 19th century Western proponents of Buddhism. 
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How many means of valid knowledge in Buddhism:  
one, two, or three?
Contemporary discussions of Buddhist epistemology have demonstrated a variety 
of positions on the question of the number of means of valid knowledge. Some of 
these, however, have simply demonstrated contemporary prejudices, rather than 
being informed by any philosophic reflection or understanding of the issues as they 
developed historically within the Buddhist tradition itself. 
One means of valid knowledge 
Dating from the earliest period of the Buddhist tradition, the Kalama Sutta is one 
of the best-known sources regarding issues of religious authority in the Buddhist 
canon. According to the text, the Buddha, upon arriving in the town of Kesaputta, 
is approached by its inhabitants, the Kalamas. Describing the number of religious 
teachers who have visited their town and given contradictory teachings, have lauded 
their own teachings, and deprecated the teachings of others, the Kalamas express 
their doubt and confusion. The Buddha replies to their concerns, saying 
Of course you are uncertain, Kalamas. Of course you are in doubt. When there are reasons 
for doubt, uncertainty is born. So in this case, Kalamas, don’t go by reports, by legends, 
by traditions, by scripture, by logical conjecture, by inference, by analogies, by agreement 
through pondering views, by probability, or by the thought, ‘This contemplative is our 
teacher’. When you know for yourselves that, ‘These qualities are unskillful; these qualities 
are blameworthy; these qualities are criticized by the wise; these qualities, when adopted 
& carried out, lead to harm & to suffering’—then you should abandon them. (Thanissaro 
[s.d.]) 
While it appears that some interpreters have seen this as the basis for an 
individualistic ethics (ibid., translator’s note), it has a more general application to the 
question of religious authority. This and other similar texts have been understood by 
some contemporary interpreters as indicating an empiricist epistemology—the idea 
that experience is the sole means of valid knowledge. 
While not citing the Kalama Sutta per se, Elizabeth Valentine evidences this 
idea that the Buddhist tradition holds experience to be the sole means of valid 
knowledge. Her initial assertion is that ‘Experience is the starting point of all 
our knowledge’ (Valentine 1997, 208). As support for this, she goes on to cite not 
Under the influence of Protestant conceptions of scripture, they sought the authority of the Buddha’s 
words in the same way that their contemporaries were seeking the authoritative words of Jesus. This 
latter of course initiated the ‘quest for the historical Jesus’, and for the earliest Gospel source. Bud-
dhist studies has also seen a similar quest for the historical Buddha, though without also appropriat-
ing the mistaken notion that demonstrating the truth of historical claims regarding the existence of 
Jesus also demonstrates the truth of religious claims regarding his divinity. 
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Buddhist epistemological thinkers—despite the fact that Buddhism is the putative 
topic of her essay—but instead uncritically cites the physicist Erwin Schrödinger 
and the statistician Karl Pearson (Valentine 1997, 208–9).20 On this basis then, 
she makes a general epistemological claim that ‘all knowledge is essentially 
mental, psychological’ (ibid. 1997, 209).21 She goes on to make a strategic move 
common among modernising Buddhist apologists, which is to claim the authority 
of ‘Buddhism’ when she claims that ‘Here, as so often, Buddhism has penetrated 
to the truth; indeed no sharp distinction is drawn between sensations and thoughts’ 
(ibid.).22
Valentine’s argument that experience is the sole means of valid knowledge skirts 
very close to solipsism. She asserts that 
According to Buddhism, both the external world and the self, the perceiver, are constructions, 
conceptual fabrications. The fundamental insight from meditation is that the projecting 
process knows itself, that is all, nothing else; there are no atomic minds and no unknowable 
things in themselves. (Valentine 1997, 211) 
The characterisation of consciousness given by Valentine reflects the formulation 
of the problematic of the human condition within Buddhism. We can refer to this as the 
‘deluded self’. The deluded self is out of touch with the realities of human existence, 
believing that persons—including oneself—and things have an essential self, that is, 
one that is permanent, eternal, absolute, unchanging. It is the deluded character of 
20 In fact, only one of her sources is Buddhist, and that one is itself problematic. This is Jeremy 
W. Hayward (Valentine 1997, 209, 212, 214), who as a disciple of Chögyam Trungpa inherited an 
explicitly modernising version of Buddhism and is a teacher of the Shambhala Training, which 
is itself presented as something other than Buddhism. This is, of course, another one of Buddhist 
modernism’s strategies. By focusing on meditation, it is possible to deny that Buddhism is a religion 
(which protects it from being in competition with Christianity), but simply a philosophy, a way of 
life, or some other formulation that attempts to conceal the role of ideology, asserting instead that 
Buddhist meditation—or in this case, the Shambhala Training—does not depend on any specific 
belief system. See, for example, <http://sti.shambhala.org/> (accessed 26 November 2006).
21 There seems to have been a rather major slippage here, in that her argument goes from being 
based on sensation to being ‘essentially mental’. This ignores the philosophic problems involved in 
psychologising epistemology. Consider, for example, Husserl’s retreat from his early psychologising 
of mathematics in light of these kinds of problems when they were pointed out to him by Frege 
(Smith 2007, 18).
22 This passing use of the undefined term ‘Buddhism’ functions here as little more than an empty 
signifier, ready to be filled with whatever modernising apologia she sees fit, while still claiming the 
authority of the tradition. Additionally, it is misleading for her to state without any qualification 
whatever that ‘no sharp distinction is drawn between sensations and thoughts’, as she does. While it 
is true that they are included in the same category under some of the organisational schemas found 
in the abhidharma literature (skandhas, dhātus, and āyatanas), they are distinct elements within those 
categories. While mental perception of thoughts may be interpreted as being treated on a par with 
the visual perception of visual objects, there are distinctions made between the five physical senses 
and the mental in the literature. More generally, however, there is a problem with simply equating the 
concept of experience as found in the suttas with empiricism as a Western post-Enlightenment epis-
temological position, in that the equivalency of the two kinds of empiricism needs to be established.
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most of our living in the world that Buddhism seeks to address. It would be a mistake, 
however, to take Valentine’s characterisations as indicating that Buddhism holds a 
solipsistic view, for to do so would deny the possibility of awakening, of liberation 
from the deluded condition. If there is nothing known but a self-reflective process of 
projection, which presumably is the round of suffering (saṃsāra), then there is no 
Archimedean point outside of that process that provides leverage for change.23
At the same time, it would be a mistake to see Buddhism as holding to a simplistic 
notion that perception can be direct or unmediated—as the commonly employed 
analogy of the mirror would seem to imply.24 In this analogy, the mind of ordinary, 
deluded awareness is likened to a mirror obscured by dust and corrosion, while 
the mind of awakened awareness is likened to a mirror polished and bright—one 
that simply reflects the actuality of things as they are. Invoked in many discussions 
of the effects of meditation, such a simplistic view in fact runs directly counter to 
both the conceptions of Buddhist philosophy regarding the constructed character of 
conscious awareness and contemporary perceptual psychology. But absolute accuracy 
of perception is not the goal, as that is not liberating. It is freedom from the delusion 
of an essential self (ātman, that is, either of persons or of things) that liberates. It is 
attachment to the delusion of an essential self—permanent and unchanging—that 
is problematic for human existence. Liberation from that deluded view is what is 
important—not a naïve empiricism. 
Three means of valid knowledge
At least implicitly many within the Buddhist tradition accept three means of valid 
knowledge. Matthieu Ricard, for example, makes this epistemological stance 
explicit, asserting that Buddhists accept three means of valid knowledge: perception, 
inference, and testimony (Ricard 2003). As given, however, this is on his part simply 
an assertion of the three-means epistemology for all of Buddhism, without providing 
any justification or nuancing of his position in relation to the position of the Buddhist 
epistemologists, which was well-known and long-debated in the Tibetan scholastic 
tradition—the tradition of Buddhism to which he himself adheres. Because Ricard 
simply asserts this claim, we have no means of engaging his claim other than pointing 
out that he simply asserts it.
23 See also Georges Dreyfus, who rejects the interpretation of Dharmakīrti’s view by some con-
temporary scholars as an extreme nominalism. ‘Scholars who think of Dharmakīrti as a nominalist 
often understand his view to be extreme. They think that Dharmakīrti rejects not only the reality of 
the referents of general terms, which is true, but even their objective basis, which is wrong’ (Dreyfus 
1997, 133).
24 For a discussion of this metaphoric conception of the mind in Western philosophy, see Rorty 
1981. 
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Two means of valid knowledge
The Buddhist epistemologists, however, took a more stringent view and only 
accepted two means of valid knowledge—perception and inference—eliminating 
testimony, along with all the other pramāṇas, as lacking any autonomy. In relation to 
our considerations here of the authority of the Buddha, it is important to emphasise 
that the Buddhist epistemologists did not eliminate testimony as a reliable means of 
knowledge, only that it was reducible to other means. Therefore, testimony is not 
in itself a means of valid knowledge in the way that perception and inference are. 
Further, the question of the authority of the Buddha concerns the question of relying 
on him as a means of valid knowledge about religious life—the ground, path and 
goal—and not on other issues.25 
Dignāga (ca. 480–540) is considered to be the founder of the school of Buddhist 
epistemologists. His most important work is the Pramāṇasamuccaya (Compendium 
on Reliable Knowledge). Dharmakīrti (ca. 600–670) is the most influential member 
of the school, so much so that his work has effectively displaced Dignāga’s for much 
of the later scholastic tradition. Dharmakīrti’s best-known work—one that continues 
to be studied and debated even today by Tibetan scholastics—is the Pramāṇavārttika 
(Commentary of Reliable Knowledge). As is often the case in Indian scholasticism, 
Dharmakīrti’s work is not a commentary in the same sense that we would understand a 
commentary—as primarily an explanation. Although based on the Pramāṇasamuccaya, 
Dignāga’s text simply provides the structure upon which Dharmakīrti develops his 
own thinking about the same issues. 
Mokṣākaragupta, a later member of the group of Buddhist epistemologists, argues 
strongly for ‘the Buddhist theory that valid cognition is of two kinds, indeterminate 
(pratyakṣa [RKP: rendered in this essay by the more common “perception”]) and 
determinate knowledge (anumāna [RKP: here, “inference”])’ (Kajiyama 1998, 2)26 
in his Tarkabhāṣā. 
Mokṣākaragupta considers two arguments for accepting śabda as a means of valid 
knowledge—first, the argument from a real connection between word and referent 
25 It is often assumed in Western discussions of Buddhism that the Buddhist idea of the Awak-
ened One includes the idea of his omniscience. The limitation of the Buddha as a reliable means of 
knowledge in the authors being considered here suggests that the conceptions of the Buddha’s knowl-
edge are simply equatable to Christian conceptions of the omniscience of God. Although the epithet 
of ‘all-knowing’ (sarvajñā) would seem to support this equation, the question of what that word itself 
meant is more complex than a simple, straightforward etymology would suggest. More generally 
then, in making comparisons between Buddhist thought and Christian it is entirely inappropriate to 
simply assume that one-to-one substitutions based on analogy (God in Christianity is omniscient. 
Buddha is for Buddhism the same as God is for Christianity. Therefore Buddha is omniscient) are in 
any way meaningful or informative.
26 For philological discussions of pratyakṣa and anumāna, see Kajiyama 1998, 29 and 30 respec-
tively. 
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(sambandha, discussed supra), and second, the argument from the trustworthiness 
of certain speakers. In relation to the idea of a real connection existing between 
words and their referents, he considers two possibilities—that the connection is one 
of identity and that it is one of causality. He argues against the idea that a word 
and its referent are identical on the grounds that if this were the case, then there 
would not be a plurality of languages. Introducing a hypothetical ‘man from Nicobar’, 
that is, someone who does not speak Sanskrit, he says that if words were identical 
with their referents then such a man should already know that ‘agni’ means fire.27 
Mokṣākaragupta argues that because the ‘man from Nicobar’ does not know that fire 
is the meaning of ‘agni’ is proof that no such identity exists.
The argument against causality as the basis for there being a real connection 
between words and their referents is a bit more complicated. Behind Mokṣākaragupta’s 
argument is the concept of vyapti or ‘pervasion’, which played an important role in 
the development of Buddhist epistemology (see Jackson 1993, 103–4).28 He argues 
that if there were a real connection between words and their referents then the two 
would pervade one another, that is where one is found the other would also always 
be found (anvaya), and where one is absent then the other would also always be 
absent (vyatireka). As Mokṣākaragupta says, ‘a causal relation [{is not} possible 
between the word and the thing-meant {i.e., its referent}], since neither concomitance 
in agreement (anvaya) nor in difference (vyatireka) is observed [between them]’ 
(Kajiyama 1998, 32).29 When he later addresses the question of the authority of the 
Vedas, Mokṣākaragupta simply dismisses it as having already been dealt with by his 
argument regarding the two bases for a real connection existing between words and 
their referents. 
The argument Mokṣākaragupta makes against a trustworthy speaker is quite 
striking as it applies rather directly to our considerations of the authority of the 
Buddha, and so is worth quoting in extenso:
It is also not acceptable that the words spoken by trustworthy persons are a means of 
valid knowledge, since trustworthiness is impossible to be ascertained. The state of being 
emancipated from all faults (kṣıṇadoṣatva) is called trustworthiness (āptatva). Emancipation 
27 For a response to Mokṣakaragupta’s argument, see Dalvi [s.d.]. Dalvi’s response is based on 
the notion that there are certain ‘basic conditions under which knowledge through sabda becomes 
possible ... [including] among other things, the hearer to understand the language of the speaker’ (pp. 
6–7). This seems to me to make the notion of a real relation between word and referent so weak as to 
be effectively meaningless, or simply an implicit admission that the connection is conventional, that 
is, in this case based on sharing a common language rather than being located somewhere external 
to the subjects in communication with one another. 
28 Jackson employs another rendering for vyapti that is also found in the literature, ‘invariable 
concomitance’. 
29 Note: material in square brackets are the translator’s additions, while the material in braces is 
this author’s. 
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from all faults refers to a certain state belonging to another person’s mind. And this is 
hardly visible [i.e. determinable], since we see [sometimes] that physical and lingual 
actions [supposed] to be the logical mark [through which we infer the trustworthiness 
of the concerned person] occur in persons who are not [really trustworthy]. When it is 
usual that a man having passions pretends to be free from passions, how can you ascertain 
trustworthiness? (Kajiyama 1998, 34–5) 
Mokṣākaragupta’s skepticism provides perhaps an interesting insight into the 
sociology of religion in his day—that people engaging in the pretence of being free from 
faults were so common as to produce this very sense of scepticism about their claims.
These epistemological views—only two means of valid knowledge and a sceptical 
attitude toward the reliability of people claiming to be trustworthy means of knowledge 
about religious matters—created a logical problem for the tradition, particularly 
regarding the authority of Śākyamuni Buddha as a means of valid knowledge about 
the nature of the ground of human existence, the path of religious life, and the goal of 
awakening. In other words this is a question regarding the status of ‘buddhavacana’, 
the speech of a buddha. 
The question of the appeal to authority cannot be treated in a narrowly 
epistemological framework alone but rather is enmeshed with the religious questions 
central to Buddhism (Dreyfus 1997, 441). The historical integrity of Buddhism as 
a religious institution depends on the idea of lineage, that is on the authority of 
the Buddha Śākyamuni as the Awakened One and the transfer of that authority to 
subsequent members of the Buddhist sangha. While having broader ramifications, to 
the extent, however, that the awakening of the Buddha has been understood (at least 
metaphorically) as the waking up from the sleep of ignorance (avidya), the authority 
of the Buddha is itself an epistemological matter.
The structure of Dharmakīrti’s argument regarding  
the authority of the Buddha
Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika is his most famous and most influential text and is 
presented as a discussion of Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya. The ‘Pramāṇasiddhi’ 
(‘perfection of knowledge’) chapter of the Pramāṇavārttika is a lengthy comment on 
the opening lines of Dignāga’s text, which Roger Jackson has translated as:
To the one who has become an authority, the one who desires to benefit beings, the teacher, 
the sugata (‘well-gone’), the savior, I bow down.
In order to establish authority, I make here a single compendium of my various scattered 
writings. (Jackson 1993, 127)
As Jackson notes, ‘Dharmakīrti’s primary purpose in the Pramāṇasiddhi chapter is 
to demonstrate that the Buddha is an authority for those intent on spiritual freedom, or 
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liberation’ (ibid.). The five epithets of the Buddha listed by Dignāga give Dharmakīrti 
the basic structure for his arguments regarding the authority of the Buddha: 
1. pramāṇabhūta: that the Buddha has become an authority,
2. jagadhitaiṣin: that the Buddha desires to benefit other living beings,
3. śāstṛ: that the Buddha is a teacher,
4. sugata: that the Buddha is ‘well-gone’, and
5. tāyin: that the Buddha is a protector (translated above as ‘savior’). 
Before attempting to demonstrate that the Buddha has become an authority—
the first of Dignāga’s five epithets—it is necessary for Dharmakīrti to define the 
concept of authority itself. To do so, Dharmakīrti identifies three characteristics of 
authoritative knowledge.30 Authoritative knowledge is (1) original and not derivative, 
(2) cognitive and not either apperception or some other, perceptual, means, and (3) not 
contradicted by either of the two autonomous means of valid knowledge, perception 
or inference (Jackson 1993, 129; see also, van Bijlert 1989). 
The first step in Dharmakīrti’s definition of authority is that direct, perceptual 
knowledge is authoritative because it constitutes an original (Jackson uses ‘new’) 
‘non-deceptive’ cognition (Jackson 1993, 176). rGyal tshab rje is the Tibetan author 
of an important commentary on Dharmakīrti’s text, which is itself translated and 
commented on by Roger Jackson. rGyal tshab rje explains that this non-deceptive 
cognition differs from apperception in that authoritative cognitions, such as those 
based on a perception (of, for example, a patch of blue), are ‘immediately and self-
evidently authoritative’—as Jackson puts it (ibid., 177, n. 2). Apperception of a 
perception, however, is itself only authoritative about the perception per se and not 
about the cognition based on it. (This seems to fit well with contemporary arguments 
regarding the authority of first-person, subjective experience.) This is made 
clearer with regard to other authoritative cognitions, such as those based on prior 
experience—exemplified by the authoritative character of our cognition regarding 
the causal efficacy of ‘cooking, burning, etc.’ (ibid., 176). 
Speech is also non-deceptive to the extent that one cognises the meaning intended. 
As Richard Hayes has said in relation to Dignaga’s understanding of this point, ‘a 
linguistic sign (śabda) serves as an inferential sign (liṅga) to produce in the hearer of 
the symbol knowledge that the subject of discourse, the thing to which the speaker 
of the symbol is applying the symbol, has a given property’ (Hayes 1988, 203). In 
30 Jackson’s discussion seems to reflect the terse character of the Sanskrit original in that he 
simply speaks of ‘authority’. For presentation here we will employ various adjectival uses of the term 
authority, while at the same time recognising that these are not substantive distinctions, but rather 
simply ones imposed by the grammar of ordinary English. Thus, the assertion that the Buddha is an 
authority is identical with the assertion that he possesses authoritative knowledge, without reifying 
these as two separate things. 
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other words, testimony is not an autonomous means of valid knowledge, although it 
may be the case that one can truly understand a statement, since that knowledge does 
not necessarily extend to the truth of that statement. That is, truly understanding a 
statement does not extend validity to cognition of the referent. To employ an example 
frequently used in Buddhist thought, one can speak of—and understand what is 
meant by—the phrase ‘horns of a rabbit’. As rabbits do not have horns, however, 
there is no objective referent to that phrase. Thus, one can authoritatively cognise the 
meaning of the speech, without having that speech extend authoritative cognition to 
any referent.31 
This same reasoning regarding the difference between the cognition of word, 
meaning and referent extends to the commentaries on the words of the Buddha (i.e., 
śāstra as distinct from sūtra, which according to the tradition are records of the 
Buddha’s teachings). While we can have authoritative cognition of the words of a 
śastra and their meaning, that does not give us authoritative cognition of the referents 
of the words of a śāstra. ‘Not everything for which we have a name actually exists’ 
(Hayes 1988, 178, n. 6). 
Authoritative cognitions must also be original (new, novel).32 This is required 
because a derivative33 cognition such as a memory depends upon, or derives from, 
some other cognition.34 While an authoritative cognition directly (immediately, 
independently) apprehends its object (as in the cognition based on the perception 
of a blue patch), memory (and other such derivative) cognitions are not in direct 
apprehension of their object, but depend on other, prior cognitions. In Dharmakīrti’s 
(or rGyal tshab rje’s) view then, it is apparently the case that the authority of the prior 
cognitions does not carry forward to give memories an equal authority.35 
The argument made for the position that authority is cognitive reflects the religious 
and pragmatic orientation, i.e., the concern being the authority of the Buddha for 
those seeking awakening. The cognitive dimension of authority is explained in terms 
of the mind being the causal agent for engaging in actions conducive to awakening 
31 This would seem to imply a three-term relation between word, meaning and referent. More im-
mediately, it would seem to connect with the idea of language being conventional, rather than being 
based on some real relation [sambandha]. This also connects with Dignāga’s theory of meaning by 
exclusion, but that complicated and tendentious topic is outside our range of concerns in this essay.
32 This is based on a philological understanding of the term pramāṇa, specifically regarding the 
prefix ‘pra-’. Dharmakīrti and others following his interpretation understand this to mean ‘new’. 
Another school, the Prāsaṇgikas, understood it to mean ‘foremost’, i.e., best. (Consider, for example, 
how we would understand the meaning of the prefix ‘pre-’.) See, Cozort, Preston 2003, 73.
33 Jackson uses ‘conventional’. Does he mean construction rather than convention? In any event, 
it seems clear that the significance of the argument is that such cognitions are derivative, which is 
therefore the term I will use here.
34 For a general discussion of memory in Western epistemology, see Audi 2003, 56–74.
35 This would seem to actually complicate the case for causal efficacy discussed supra.
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and rejecting those with are not (Jackson 1993, 179). This becomes even clearer as 
Dharmakīrti moves into his argument for the authority of the Buddha.
Having defined what authority means, Dharmakīrti is now ready to explain how 
it is that the Buddha is an authority. First, the Buddha is an authority in the sense 
defined because he does in fact possess ‘new, non-deceptive cognition’ (ibid., 188). 
This cognition of the Buddha’s is an accomplishment and is not an inherent quality 
such as that asserted by theists to be true of deities. The Buddha has attained ‘method 
and wisdom’ as a constant state of cognition (ibid., 194). Dharmakīrti goes on to 
identify what kind of an authority the Buddha is. 
According to Dharmakīrti, religious teachers are sought after because they 
have a ‘method of pacifying suffering’ (ibid., 216). In other words, for the Buddhist 
epistemologists, ‘Someone is an authority who has cognition of what is to be adopted 
and rejected, together with the methods’ for effecting such adoption and rejection 
(ibid., 218). 
That the religious authority of the Buddha is not omniscience36 as conceived in 
the Western theological descriptions of the attributes of God is made evident when 
Dharmakīrti says that ‘[f]or us, [a teacher’s] knowledge of how many insects there are 
is not at all useful’ (ibid., 217). Or, as he also says, ‘If it is the case that [you define] 
authority [by] seeing a great distance, rely on the vulture [as your teacher]’ (ibid., 218). 
These latter assertions help to clarify the view widely-held among Buddhists of many 
different lineages that while supernatural powers (ṛddhi) may result from meditative 
practice, they are not to be confused with the actual goal, which is awakening (bodhi). 
Because the Buddha ‘has complete perceptual cognition of what is to be adopted 
and what rejected … together with the methods’ thereto, then he ‘is an authority for 
those intent on freedom’ (ibid.). It is, then, in this specific and limited sense that the 
Buddha is an authority—that his testimony on religious matters of liberation from 
afflictive and cognitive obscurations can be accepted. 
Clearly, the question of the authority of the speech of the Buddha is directly related 
to the question of scriptural authority. This issue was also addressed by Dharmakīrti.
Scriptual authority
Both Hinduism and Christianity rely on a foundational set of texts that are held to be 
exceptional, to have a non-human authorship—the Vedas and the Bible. The Buddhist 
tradition seems to be much more ambiguous about the status of its scriptural sources. 
36 Sarvajña is an epithet of the Buddha that has uncritically been rendered as ‘omniscience’ by 
the easiest, most literal translation as ‘all’ (sarva-) ‘knowing’ (-jña). In light of Dharmakīrti’s com-
ments, perhaps sarvajña might be better rendered as ‘knowing thoroughly, knowing completely, 
knowing accurately’. 
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The teaching that the Buddha has three-bodies (trikāya) complicates the simple story 
propagated by Buddhist modernists. According to this latter view, the Buddha is 
simply a human being—an exceptional one, yes, but not ontologically different from 
the rest of us. The teachings of the Buddha, then, are simply on a par with the insights, 
the wisdom that would be available to us from anyone who has attained such a state 
of awakening. 
However, beginning in the early medieval period of Indian Buddhism, there 
developed the idea of the Buddha’s three bodies, or what we might perhaps call three 
forms of the Buddha’s existence. First, there is the historically existing figure of 
Śākyamuni (nirmanakāya), second, a glorious body, exemplified by such figures as 
Amitābha (sambhogakāya), and third, a body identical with the actual existence of 
all things, i.e., their emptiness (dharmakāya). Clearly, the ontological status of these 
latter two bodies of the Buddha is different from that of ordinary humans. Thus, texts 
said to be spoken by these kinds of Buddhas might be thought to be authoritative in 
the same way that the Vedas and the Bible are authoritative. What we find, however, 
is that the approach of Dharmakīrti and the other Buddhist epistemologists is much 
more measured and continues to employ the two means of valid cognition as the 
criteria for the authority of scriptures said to be spoken by the sambhogakāya and 
dharmakāya as well. 
Perhaps more importantly as far as the Buddhist tradition itself is concerned, the 
very nature of a buddha’s teachings, what is known as the dharma, is simply true because 
it is an expression of the way things are. This proved problematic for scholastics within 
the tradition, however, who in turn developed the idea of heuristics (upaya) as a means 
of explaining differences between texts. While the scope of this essay is such as to 
not allow us to go into all of these issues in detail, they do form part of the overall 
background when considering Dharmakīrti’s views on the status of scripture. 
Dharmakīrti directly deals with the issue of scriptural authority, specifically in 
the form of the question of inferences based on scripture. A reliable scripture is one 
that meets a three-fold set of criteria. First, ‘it does not describe verifiable perceptible 
matters (pratyakṣa) in a way which would be in contradiction with observation’ 
(Tillemans 1999, 395). Second, it ‘does not describe rationally accessible, but 
imperceptible matters (parokṣa) … in a way that would be in contradiction with … 
“objective inference”’, it is ‘not in any way [dependent upon] belief, acceptance or 
faith in someone or his words’ (ibid.).37 Third, its ‘description of matters inaccessible 
to either observation or objective inference (vastubalapravṛttānumāna) are not 
internally contradictory’ (ibid.). 
37 The term ‘objective reasoning’ is Tilleman’s more euphonic rendering of what would more 
literally be ‘inference functioning by the force of real entities’ (vastubalapravṛttānumāna) (p. 395). 
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One of the consequences of Dharmakīrti’s formulation of this three-fold criteria 
for a scripture that can be relied upon for inference is to avoid the kind of conflict 
between reason and faith that has plagued Western philosophy of religion for—
what, millennia? Quoting Tom Tillemans’ discussion of Dharmakīrti’s treatment of 
scriptural authority in extenso:
Now, if the scripture passes this triple test, it is fit to be used in ‘scripturally based 
inferences’, but with the all-important stipulation that such inferences are only to be 
used in case of radically inaccessible matters (atyantaparokṣa), ones which are not in 
the domain of observation or objective reasoning, but are only accessible once we have 
accepted (abhyupagata) scripture [as reliable according to the three-fold test]. In short, 
āgamaśritānumāna works where objective inference and observation leave off. In this 
way Dharmakīrti rather effectively avoids the recurring conflict between reason and faith 
(more technically here, viruddhāvyabhicāra), for the type of inference which depends on 
acceptance [of scripture as reliable] will only treat of things outside the domain of objective 
reasoning. (Ibid., 395–96) 
In considering Tilleman’s description of the limitations on the use of scripture,38 it 
38 One of the participants in the conference where this paper was first presented mistook 
Dharmakīrti’s limitation on the use of reasoning from reliable scripture to matters that are beyond 
perception and inference as an indication that Buddhism suffered from a ‘God of the gaps’ theology, 
a derogatory term and at least implicitly therefore a derogatory allegation regarding Dharmakīrti’s 
argument. At the time I was not able to respond as clearly as I would have liked—not being a theo-
logian, the term ‘God of the gaps’ was opaque to me. The only similarity between the two, however, 
is that both are concerned with knowledge other than that verified by perception or inference. A 
‘God of the gaps’ theology is an argument for the existence of God on the basis of the limitations—
gaps—in scientific knowledge: science cannot explain everything, so the difference between what 
science can explain and everything proves that there is something beyond science; therefore God 
exists. It is, in other words, a theological version of the argument from ignorance. Given the ex-
pansion of scientific knowledge, such an argument for the role of God is seen as one of continued 
retrenchment. 
Although there is an only superficial similarity, as has been pointed out elsewhere in this 
paper, Buddhism does not in general take on the role of explaining the existence and nature of the 
cosmos. This has traditionally been part of Christian thought, which inherits this function from the 
mythology embedded in Genesis. God’s creative role as explanatory of the nature of the cosmos thus 
comes into conflict with scientific explanations. However, even to the extent that Buddhism does 
propose cosmogonic and cosmological explanations, these are in large part simply adopted from 
Indic religious culture, and they are in no way central to Buddhist religious thought, concerned as it 
is with awakening to the truth of emptiness. From a Buddhist perspective, there is something very 
odd about asking whether or not the six realms of birth (gods, titans, humans, animals, hungry ghosts, 
and hell-beings) is literally true. 
One is reminded here of the allegory spoken by the Buddha in response to being asked why he 
did not respond to such questions as whether the universe were infinite or not. He says that to ask 
such questions is like a man who has been struck by an arrow asking about the kind of wood that 
the arrow is made from, the kind of bird whose feathers were used to fletch the arrow, the wood of 
the bow, the material of the bowstring, the caste of the person who shot him, and so on. The critical 
issue is to remove the arrow. Thus it is with humans faced with the reality of their own self-produced 
dissatisfaction and disease. The gaps in scientific knowledge are not of any particular interest to 
Buddhist thought, which to the best of my knowledge never claimed the explanatory scope that 
Christian theology has at some points in its own history. Rather, it is the problematic character of 
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is important to keep in mind that the goal of Dharmakīrti’s arguments to establish that 
the Buddha is a reliable authority are in relation to the issues of the religious life for 
those seeking awakening. This is not a general argument regarding recourse to scripture 
for any and all knowledge beyond ‘where objective inference and observation leave 
off’, but rather for the sake of reliable knowledge about the ground, path and goal, 
that is, the problematic nature of human existence, the path of efficacious practices, 
and the goal of awakening.39
Conclusion
One of the things that seems to make Indic thought relevant to modern philosophy 
is the centrality of the concern with epistemology for both. Jürgen Habermas, for 
example, asserts that the only question for modern philosophy is ‘how is reliable 
knowledge possible’ (Habermas 1971, 3).40 
For Buddhism the primacy of epistemology is not as an abstract set of intellectual 
concerns divorced from the practical issues of life. Rather, for the Buddhist tradition 
epistemology is central to the goal of awakening. The Indian religio-philosophic 
traditions in general do not describe the problematics of the human condition as 
an ethical condition—sin—but, rather, see as our primary problematic ignorance 
(avidya). Jeffrey Hopkins opens a series of lectures by stating ‘Nirvana is an 
extinguishment of desire, hatred, and ignorance that is often likened to the dying of a 
flame. Since ignorance is the fuel or source of both desire and hatred, the primary task 
in achieving nirvana is to remove ignorance’ (Hopkins 1984, 15). Given the important 
epistemological dimension of Buddhist conceptions of the path to awakening, 
Buddhism has often been considered to be a form of gnosticism.41 It is important 
to note, therefore, that in the broader Indic epistemological tradition knowledge is 
not the possession of a ‘justified true belief’ by a subject as it has been conceived 
by most members of the Western philosophic tradition since at least the time of 
Descartes. In contrast, in Indic epistemology knowledge is ‘a mental event that 
cognizes the object as a momentary knowledge event’, part of a ‘phenomenologically 
continuous’ cognitive process marked by certainty. Thus, ridding oneself of delusion 
human existence, the question of which practices are actually efficacious, and the nature of the goal 
of awakening that structure critical reflection in Buddhism.
39 An important recent contribution to the literature on the question of the authority of the Bud-
dha, but which appeared too late to integrate into this paper, is McClintock 2010.
40 Not all contemporary philosophers share Habermas’s understanding of philosophy. See, for 
example, Alain Badiou’s assertion that ontology, not epistemology, is the central issue (Norris 2009, 2).
41 It is indicative of this idea that Edward Conze, who is perhaps most responsible for the com-
mon use of the phrase ‘perfection of wisdom’ for the Prajñāpāramitā literature, dubbed his autobi-
ography The Memoirs of a Modern Gnostic (Conze 1979). 
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is not ridding oneself of false beliefs (heresy), but rather accurately perceiving how 
the world works. This allows us to avoid the frustrations (duḥkha) consequent upon 
trying to live in a world that works the way we want it to, but in fact does not.42 
Specifically, for Buddhism religiously significant ignorance is of the nature 
of existence, or—to put it colloquially—of how things work. What one needs to 
realise—come to understand and to actualise in one’s life—has been identified under 
a variety of rubrics during the course of Buddhist history. One of these is the three 
marks of existence—everything that actually exists is lacking in permanence, lacking 
in essence, and a source of dissatisfaction. 
Such realisation can be attained either through yogic practices, or through 
cognitive practices. Part of the rhetoric of Buddhist modernism has been to privilege 
silent seated meditation as Buddhist practice. Although this view is, of course, not 
without historical precedent, it is necessary to provide some balance to the Buddhist 
modernist representations of Buddhism that are overwhelmingly dominant in popular 
culture.43 Indeed, the question people commonly ask in discussions about one’s own 
religious affiliation is, Are you a practicing Buddhist? This evidences the extent of 
this privileging of meditation. Yet from its very earliest forms, both ‘right view’ and 
‘right practice’ have been part of the Buddhist path. Lama Mipham, one of the most 
famous leaders of the 19th century movement to unify Tibetan Buddhist teachings44 
(Tib. ris med), addresses the role of cognitive practices in the realisation of emptiness. 
By accustoming oneself to the ingrained tendency toward śūnyatā (emptiness, lack of 
essence), one will eliminate the tendency toward concrete entities. Eventually, even the 
accustoming oneself to the complete non-existence of entities will be eliminated. When 
one cannot represent an entity to be investigated as ‘that which is non-existent’, then how 
can non-existence, being without a basis, remain before the intellect? When neither entities 
nor their negation as an abstraction remain before the intellect, then, since there is no other 
possibility, the discursive intellect is pacified, there being nothing to objectify. (Quoted 
from Lipman 1992, 32) 
Śabdapramāṇa has generally been treated in English-language philosophic 
discussions under the category of ‘testimony’, a convention that we have in general 
42 The implications of this, even for understanding what a Buddha is, are very important. In light 
of this, the equation of the epithet sarvajñā (‘all-knowing’) with the omniscience of the Christian de-
ity would seem to be mistaken.
43 It is important to note, however, that this dichotomy between yogic practice and epistemology 
is not unique to Buddhist modernism. According to Tom Tillemans, for example, it is a long-standing 
issue in Tibetan Buddhism, there being ‘many Tibetans who maintain a strong separation between the 
meditational-yogic aspects of Buddhism—which they take as being quintessential—and its logico-phil-
osophical speculations, which they take as being by and large of little or no religious value’ (Tillemans 
1993, 2). The treatment of epistemology as ‘being without much soteriological import’ (ibid.), however, 
was not the only view, as many also held that epistemology was directly conducive to awakening. 
44 For a discussion of the ris med movement, including Mipham’s role in it, see Ringu Tulku 
(2006).
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followed in this essay. There is, however, an important nuance that serves to 
distinguish the two—and it seems to me that this is a distinction that does indeed 
make a difference. Epistemological considerations of testimony focus (almost) 
entirely on the qualities or status of the ‘speaker’. For example, does the speaker’s 
knowledge have to be first hand for it to be considered a reliable form of testimony? 
Or, does hearsay also count? Do documents, which are ‘not an obvious product of 
[any] obvious speech act’ count as a form of testimony? (Coady 1992, 50). Does the 
information provided by such social practices as ‘road signs, maps, the measurement 
markings on rulers, destination-markers on buses and trams, the author attribution on 
the title-page of a book, and so on’ count as testimony? (ibid., 51: referring to H.H. 
Price). Thus, we can see that the focus in Western epistemological considerations of 
testimony is on the qualities or status of the speaker, broadly construed to include 
author, document, record, and so on. In contrast to this, in classic Indian discussions 
of śabdapramāṇa the emphasis is placed much more on what is heard. The power 
that speech per se has is located in what might be called the ‘speech-event’ rather 
than in the speech-act.45 
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